The Severity of Natural Disasters

Working Title: The Severity of Natural Disasters: A Key Determinant of the Pendulum between Civil War Negoatiation and Continuation (with Jieun Oh)

Abstract: Although natural disasters are becoming more frequent, their effect on civil war negotiation onset remains theoretically and empirically ambiguous. This study argues that the relationship between disaster severity and negotiation onset is non-linear. Specifically, only when the severity of a disaster exceeds a certain threshold do both the government and rebel groups in a territorial conflict dyad perceive greater benefits in negotiation over continued combat. At lower levels of disaster severity, however, both sides find it more advantageous to continue fighting. Using logistic regression models, we identify a U-shaped relationship between disaster severity and negotiation onset. We measure severity using one-month, two-month, and three-month cumulative disaster-related deaths, and find consistent support for our hypothesis across all specifications. Below the threshold, disaster severity slightly decreases the likelihood of negotiation onset. Only at high levels of severity does the probability of negotiation onset significantly increase. These findings help reconcile contradictory expectations in the literature by showing that the impact of natural disasters on civil conflict dynamics is conditional on severity. This study contributes to the understanding of civil war bargaining by highlighting how extreme environmental shocks recalibrate the cost-benefit calculus of conflict actors and increase the likelihood of entering negotiations.